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This chapter addresses the concept of slavery, exploring its character and 
significance as a dark page in history, but also as a specifically criminological and 
zemiological problem, in the context of international law and human rights. By 
tracing the ambiguities of slavery in international law and international 
development, the harms associated with slavery are considered. Harms include 
both those statutorily proscribed, and those that are not, but that can still be 
regarded as socially destructive. Traditionally, antislavery has been considered 
within the parameters of abolition and criminalization. In this context recently, 
anti-trafficking has emerged as a key issue in contemporary anti-slavery work. 
While valuable, anti-trafficking is shown to have significant limitations. It 
advances criminalization and stigmatization of the most vulnerable and further 
perpetuates harm. At the same time, it identifies structural conditions like 
poverty, vulnerability, and “unfreedom” of movement only to put them aside. 
Linked to exploitation, violence and zemia, the chapter brings to the fore some 
crucial questions concerning the prospects of systemic theory in the 
investigation of slavery, that highlight the root causes of slavery, primarily 
poverty and inequality. Therefore, the chapter counterposes an alternative 
approach in which the orienting target is not abolition of slavery but advancing 





A common understanding of slavery defines slavery as the practice or system of 
‘simply’ owning slaves. This is often implied to mean that slavery is either a form 
of ownership over people or a form of exploitation over the conditions one 
works. Although, both these claims fail to fully grasp slavery, the language of 
slavery figures increasingly often in Western modern judicial reasoning, 
academic analysis, and media discourse. The underpinnings of slavery often 
relate to either crime or harm.  
When considered through the lens of criminalization and crime, slavery 
was abolished internationally with the Anti-Slavery Convention 1926. Since the 
1990s, however, slavery has been redefined through references to human 
trafficking. Conversely, trafficking is mentioned in contemporary rules on 
slavery (Gallagher 2010). For instance, references to slavery are included in 
Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Protocol 2000), and vice versa, 
trafficking contributes to the definition of enslavement in Article 7(2)(c) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).1 This ambivalent 
connection between slavery and trafficking has been diffused in national 
legislations, and globally propagated as a particularly “heinous” type of crime 
(see e.g. The Voice Of America 2017).  
Yet, an understanding of slavery through the lens of harm allows us to go 
beyond the binary concept of criminal versus non-criminal acts and extends 
beyond strictly legal definitions. For the proponents of this approach, it makes 
little sense to address slavery by utilizing criminalization and crime control 
approaches, while leaving intact a wide range of physical, economic, social, 
psychological, and cultural conditions that underpin human detriment and 
suffering. This is because crime control strategies may exacerbate harms 
without resolving the underlying social, cultural, and economic conditions that 
perpetuate inequality and crime (Webber 2004; Tombs 2018; Hillyard and 
Tombs 2004). Though the term is often omitted, this approach is attuned to 
zemiology with social harm at its core. 
Originating from the Ancient Greek word zemia, zemiology carries 
numerous connotations. Existing literature defines zemiology as the “study of 
harm” (Hillyard and Tombs 2004), while zemia also denotes, among other 
things, the study of loss or damage and injury as well as the study of various 
forms of punishment, when deviant and/or legal transgressions occur (Boukli 
                                               
1 November 15, 2000, GA Res. 55/25, Annex II, UNGAOR, 55th Sess., UN Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered 
into force Dec. 25, 2003; The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, July 17, 1998, 
entered into force July 1, 2002.  
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and Kotzé 2018: 2-3). Critical scholars have therefore utilized zemiology to talk 
about structural violence, systemic conditions, and social injury. For them 
capital accumulation depends on labor exploitation, made possible by the 
inequalities that arise from social divisions in their classist, racist, sexist, and 
ablist manifestations (see Fraser 2003; Fraser and Gordon 1994). The typical 
example of the subject of capitalism, for instance, is the rational utility 
maximiser who is free from social and natural restraints or external 
interferences and who “is sleepless, tireless, hyper-able, flexible and mobile, 
continuously enhancing one’s capacity to produce and consume” (Mladenov 
2016: 1232). In turn, while capitalist exploitation and structural harms are the 
“inevitable consequence” of laissez-faire capitalism (Pemberton 2015), the 
typical focus of crime control agencies is on interpersonal violence and on 
individual responsibility. Against the grain of this normative position, 
zemiologists highlight the limitations of using criminalization as a means of 
addressing harms and shed light on exploitative structural features of 
capitalism. Applying this to slavery, the zemiological lens opens up the possibility 
of dealing with slavery, exploitation, and suffering as harms, conflicts, and 
injuries deserving mediation, arbitration, and structural remedies, rather than a 
mere crime control fix. 
The 21st century has seen re-energized anti-slavery actions, and this 
development is also reflected in academic discussion of slavery. Slavery, using 
broad brushstrokes, has been described in four ways: firstly, as direct violation 
of international anti-slavery laws and directly linked to ownership and to chattel 
slavery (see Gallagher 2010; Chapter 3 Rhetorical uses of the concept of slavery 
in the United States 1865-1914); secondly, as modern slavery and a direct 
violation of international anti-trafficking laws linked to transnational human 
trafficking and organized crime (see Segrave et al. 2009); thirdly, as “modern 
slavery” or “modern-day slavery” that marks the rise of contemporary abolition; 
finally, as an alarming attempt to depoliticize issues such as imperialism (see 
Kempadoo 2016), racism, and sexism, through sweeping measures that aim to 
criminalize migration and sex work (see Bernstein 2010). To this fourth point, 
critics have added that contemporary efforts to use the emotive term “modern 
slavery” rely on “rebranding human trafficking” using the less “legalistic” 
concept of modern slavery (Dottridge 2017; Beutin 2017). Ultimately, slavery is 
being directly linked to ownership and using the terms modern slavery, slavery, 
as well as human trafficking interchangeably has stirred much controversy.  
This chapter highlights the uneasy relationship between slavery and 
human trafficking within international law and international development from 
a zemiological standpoint. Following Julia O’Connell Davidson (2015), the 
analysis shows that both international law and international development 
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institutions inevitably take approaches that blur, rather than clarify, the lines 
between slavery and human trafficking. In doing so, anti-trafficking and anti-
slavery have formed a united front pursuing anti-immigration policies and 
border control measures cracking down on “illegal migration” in order to 
arguably protect trafficking/modern slavery survivors. There is much discussion 
of inequality, injustice, discrimination, exclusion, poverty, and abuse in the 
context of this topic (see e.g. European Commission n.d.; Anti-Slavery 
Commissioner 2016). There is also a great deal of talk about victims and 
survivors of slavery and/or human trafficking, vulnerable groups, marginalized 
communities, victims of special interest, and disempowered populations. 
However, this discourse is silent when it comes to the beneficiaries of increasing 
inequality, injustice and suffering on a global scale. It merely recognises victims 
and perpetrators of particular crimes, but remains visionless when confronted 
with the systemic matrix of human exploitation, a reality that sustains a world 
increasingly saturated with inequality and injustice. That just one percent of the 
global population owns more wealth than the other ninety nine percent is much 
more than a slogan (Hardoon 2017). 
The entry point towards investigating the above contradiction takes a 
genealogical perspective focused on discourses of slavery. Exploring the uneasy 
relationship of slavery and human trafficking in institutional discourse offers 
new insights into contemporary crimes and harms. By turning to international 
law and international development the liminality and ruptures of slavery and 
trafficking are being considered in decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United 
Nations Development Goals. The concluding section suggests an alternative 
approach, the main target of which is advancing structural change against harm. 
This builds on several themes addressed in this Handbook (see sections Legacies 
of Slavery and Human Trafficking and Human Trafficking and Response 
Mechanisms) and adds a comprehensive evaluation of the multiple harms 
involved without having to make a choice as to which harm is greater. 
Importantly, it means we do not need to choose between those harms we 
recognise and those we challenge but can instead think about different ways of 





Genealogy can take various different meanings. In its history, “genealogy” is 
etymologically linked with the Greek word geneālogía, which stands for tracing 
descent and is indicative of tracing connections. For instance, in the everyday 
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usage of the word, a genealogical tree charts the relationships and descent of 
an individual, their genes, and familial or group connections. Methodologically, 
family historians and genealogists have investigated past evidence in order to 
chart genealogical trees (see e.g. Osborn 2017). By deploying systematic efforts 
including searches in online catalogues, archives, collections, and databases, 
records emerge and are then carefully pieced together to gradually unearth 
family histories.  
Influenced by this attachment to geneālogía, in ethnography, the 
genealogical method is a procedure initiated by late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century ethnographers to identify social connections and lines of 
kinship. For instance, W.H.R. Rivers (1910) used genealogy to enhance the 
analysis of social organization by collecting systems of relationship and kinship 
through oral accounts of pedigrees. This method of collating oral accounts of 
pedigrees came to furnish the basis of the method, which was often used to 
discern a family tree from its mythical attendants. For contemporary 
ethnographers, however, the combination of genealogy and ethnography 
moves away from excavation work and deprivileges the supposed linear 
evolution of history as well as the idea that our past is broken down in small 
puzzle pieces. By extension, it also opposes the idea that as genealogists, we 
may be tasked to join these pieces back together. To the contrary, contemporary 
genealogy is oriented around disruptions, discontinuity, and critique (Mahon 
1997), with a focus on bodies and their discursive reproductions. For instance, 
instead of piecing together the scientific knowledges about slavery and modern 
slavery, genealogy adopts a more nuanced approach: it reveals the contingent 
historical conditions of the expansion of immigration detention that make it 
possible to use anti-trafficking laws to obstruct humanitarian work (see 
Townsend 2017).  
In critical theory, the genealogical approach has been used to confront 
ideas or practices that present themselves as universal and natural. This function 
of genealogy is closely linked to critique. Originating in the first generation of 
the Frankfurt School with critical theorists like Mark Horkheimer (1895-1973), 
Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), and Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), genealogy is 
an attempt to recognize that things, values, and events are constituted 
historically, discursively, and practically. Where critique is seen as an assessment 
of the current state of affairs, it is also linked to an examination of what is to be 
done to reach a desired state. In practical terms, it involves the use of dialectic, 
reason, and ethics as means to study the conditions under which people live 
(Budd 2008). In the field of epistemology, also grounded in critique, genealogy 
has come to be used as an investigative method, which offers an intrinsic 
critique of the present. Particularly in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and 
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Michel Foucault, genealogy provides the tools for uncovering the relationship 
between knowledge, power, and the formation of subjectivities. For example, 
Foucault would ask, what type of citizens are being created by anti-immigration 
policies. 
The genealogies of Nietzsche and Foucault assume that society is 
composed of contesting forces. Nietzsche refers to these contesting forces as 
will to power. Some of these forces represent an affirmative will to power, while 
others a nihilistic will to power (Nietzsche 1967). Similarly, Foucault refers to 
these contesting social forces as power. This power is not necessarily the 
coercive sorts of laws that prohibit certain acts but a more constructive power 
– in that it constructs objects, subjects, and knowledge. For instance, Foucault’s 
bio-power refers to the disciplinary effects embedded in social institutions like 
workplaces, schools, and armies, and in the “productive” policies that aim to 
organize and control health, race, gender, size, age, and other parameters 
concerning the utility of the population. Bio-power also requires forces that 
resist it. Resistance does not halt bio-power; resisting forces require bio-power 
in order to be what they are (Evans 2012; Foucault 1978). 
While some may assume that genealogy is a rather historical 
methodology, others have described genealogy as a kind of “abstractive 
practice” (Liz 2017). As an abstractive practice the task is less to glue together 
the continuity of a certain practice, and more to identify instances of a particular 
practice in order to make a wider judgement about the classification of these 
practices. For instance, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents the 
distinctively modern scientific-legal complex, from which the power to punish 
derives its bases, its justifications and rules. Specifically, Foucault orients our 
attention to the contingent and discontinuous nature of history, and he focuses 
on the technique of punishment by imprisonment in terms of the four main 
categories of archaeological analysis distinguished in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. These are: (i) prisoners as a new class of objects; (ii) the formation 
of concepts, such as the concept of the criminal character; (iii) modes of 
authority of the judge, of the parole board, and of the criminologist; (iv) 
enunciative modalities or other lines of strategies (such as different ways of 
using solitude and work in the treatment of prisoners) (Foucault 1972 (2007): 44 
– 78; Foucault 1977 (1995); Dean 1994). To these, Foucault adds (v) 
contradictions and oppositions not as secret principles to be revealed or 
appearances to overcome but as objects to be described. These categories are 
not mere linguistic expressions but underlie the power that changes the world 
(Gutting 2005: 45).  
Foucault clarifies the orientation of genealogy by saying that it is a 
“history of the present” (Foucault 1977 (1995): 31). This history of the present 
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in Discipline and Punish enables attention to the prison system, with all the 
political investments of the body, and its far-reaching technologies of power 
over the body in a closed architecture. So the focus is less on how past events 
unfolded and more on how in its present form, punishment belongs to a political 
technology of the body. 
As such, Foucault saw genealogy as a way to engage with “effects” beyond 
the mere description of transformations that take place (Deleuze 2004: 24). In 
this sense, a Foucauldian genealogy has often been described as a historical 
causal explanation that is “material, multiple, and corporeal” (Gutting 2005: 47). 
Foucault’s genealogies deconstruct, by showing their real origin, official 
meanings and evaluations involved in a society’s self-understanding. Therefore, 
to provide a genealogy is “to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or, 
conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have 
value to us” (Foucault 1977 (1995): 146). The ultimate objective is not to 
introduce the question of origin. Genealogical critique will avoid the question of 
origin, of say the origins of slavery. Instead, genealogy reveals the contingency 
of that which is said to be necessary. 
Finally, Foucault’s genealogy evokes an intimate tie between knowledge, 
power, and resistance (see e.g. Foucault 1980, 1981). This is crucial for our 
analysis of slavery, as Foucault’s basic insights sustain that changes in thought 
are not due to thought itself but due to the social forces that control and shape 
the behaviour of individuals. In this sense, the 21st century outcry for a “second” 
abolition of slavery in the context of international law and development 
emerges as a field of knowledge, a new object of inquiry, and a set of 
technologies and strategies. Further, for many the genealogical project is 
immediately bound to freedom, as it is unfolded in four different theses in 
Foucault’s thought: a) freedom and liberation are not the same thing and, 
hence, they are not tautological; b) freedom is a matter of concrete struggles 
for situated values, for instance, in anti-trafficking struggles freedom is linked to 
movement free of exploitation; c) freedom is a historical contingency, and 
therefore, historically defined; d) there is not a necessary end point in the 
struggle for freedom (see Tamboukou 1999). Therefore, at the heart of 
genealogies of slavery lies the question of how freedom is being defined. 
To engage with genealogies of slavery, in what follows we discern 
emerging narratives of ambiguity and rupture in international law and 
international development, specifically in the ways that slavery, trafficking, and 
modern slavery become intertwined. Within the emerging rather ambiguous 
liminal space between slavery and human trafficking in case law, policy, and 
academic literature, it would be misleading to assume that slavery had to mean 
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more or less the same, whenever and wherever it was used. It would also be 
inaccurate to assume that harm has been central in discussions of slavery. 
 
 
Case Law and Slavery Discourses  
 
To trace the evolution of slavery in legal discourse through three distinct general 
periods, from Classical antiquity, through to colonial transatlantic slavery trades, 
and finally, contemporary modern slavery, is part of a larger forthcoming 
project. Here we only focus on contemporary modern slavery, in order to map 
out a couple of different yet overlapping genealogies. The first is the rise of 
statistical representations of slavery generated by IGOs, NGOs, and the US 
Department of Justice (TIP reports), which hailed with force in the late 1990s, 
and fuelled narratives of grand scale victimization for illegalized migrants 
abused by precarious industries (e.g. ILO n.d.).  
The second genealogy culminates with the emergence of new anti-
trafficking legal frameworks, in the form of international law, such as the 
previously discussed Palermo Protocol (2000) and the 2005 Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (European Trafficking 
Convention). The Palermo Protocol is the first human trafficking treaty that 
integrates the “three Ps” approach (prevention, prosecution, protection) as key 
aspects in the fight against slavery and human trafficking. However, it still 
reflects the predominance of a criminalization approach that principally focuses 
on prosecution, with the majority of provisions on victim protection not being 
mandatory (e.g. Boukli 2016; Milano 2017). In turn the European Trafficking 
Convention as well as the 2011 European Union Anti-Trafficking Directive adopt 
a more holistic “four Ps” approach (prevention, prosecution, protection, 
partnerships) aiming to balance often conflicting values and objectives. 
The third genealogy then takes the form of the existing rather scarce case 
law on human trafficking and slavery. At the outset, the possibility of a 
judgement on a trafficking case using anti-slavery arguments was not clear, since 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) does not include an express 
prohibition of human trafficking. As pointed out by critics, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) finally decided to adjudicate trafficking cases through 
the application of its “living instrument” doctrine (see Milano 2017: 703). 
Particularly, below the focus turns to the ECtHR’s judgements of Siliadin v. 
France (2005), Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010), and LE v. Greece (2016). 
These are particularly important judgements because when considering the 
judgements of the ECtHR’s sister regional tribunals – the Inter-American or the 
African human rights courts – only the former has established state 
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responsibility on the basis of human trafficking in a single case (see Hacienda 
Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil), while slavery, servitude or forced labour cases 
have been examined and adjudicated. As such, it is fair to say that 1) human 
trafficking is too rarely exposed to judicial scrutiny in relation to the gravity and 
dimensions of the phenomenon, as evidenced by the fact that trafficking cases 
have been scarcely dealt with in the legal system; 2) cases of slavery have been 
more readily adjudicated as opposed to human trafficking; 3) even when human 
trafficking cases are adjudicated the main focus is on states’ obligations in 
relation to private actors’ abuses. Simultaneously, UN treaty bodies have never 
found a state responsible for violating the prohibition of human trafficking and 
the positive obligations it entails. From what follows, it becomes evident that 
through the ECHR and recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR particularly on ECHR 
Article 4, a rupture with previous judgements occurs in the liminal space where 
slavery and trafficking meet.2 
 
Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, ECtHR 2005-VII  
Starting with the ECtHR decision Siliadin v. France (2005), France was 
unanimously found in breach of the prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced and 
compulsory labour under the ECHR, Article 4 “Prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour”. This constituted the first judgement delivered by the ECtHR relating to 
both slavery and potentially human trafficking, and the events of the case 
indeed attest to these elements. Ms Siliadin was 15 years old when was brought 
from Togo to France to study. This was part of the initial agreement between 
Ms Siliadin’s father and Ms D, the person who took her to France. Ms Siliadin 
was forced instead to employment as domestic servant in Ms D’s private 
household. Her passport was confiscated, she worked 15 hours per day without 
a day off and without any payment for several years. Simultaneously, her plans 
to study did not come to fruition.  
Before the ECtHR, Ms Siliadin maintained that France was in breach of 
Article 4 of the ECHR for not having effective criminal legislation to prevent and 
combat slavery, servitude, and forced labour. While the above facts arguably fit 
                                               
2 ECHR Article 4 provides that “[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude” and that “[n]o one shall be required 
to perform forced or compulsory labour”. It is also established case law of the ECtHR that the positive obligations 
under ECHR Article 4 are absolute. ECHR Article 4(3) excludes from the ambit of the prohibition on forced or 
compulsory labor situations where the labor is carried out in the course of a prison sentence or conditional 
release, military service, any service “in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of 
the community”, or “any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations” (Art. 4(3)).  
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a human trafficking case, the ECtHR took a different view (see Piotrowicz 2012; 
Milano 2017). Importantly, the ECtHR examined what conduct is prohibited 
under Article 4 of the ECHR, as well as what the scope of State’s positive 
obligations in relation to the conduct is. Regarding the former, Article 4 of the 
ECHR shows that in the event of an employment situation leading to grave 
abuse, slavery or servitude, forced or compulsory labor, individuals can make a 
complaint. Following the definitions included in the 1930 Forced Labor 
Convention, the 1926 Slavery Convention, and the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the ECtHR distinguished between 
slavery, servitude, and forced labor, and proceeded to examine whether this 
case fell within one of these categories. 
Specifically, following the 1926 Slavery Convention “slavery is the status 
or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership are exercised”. This corresponds to the “classic” meaning of 
slavery as it was practised for centuries. However, the ECtHR concluded that 
while the applicant/Ms Siliadin was clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, 
the evidence did not suggest that she was held in slavery in this “classic” sense. 
As a genuine right of legal ownership was not exercised over her thus reducing 
her to the status of an “object” (Siliadin, para 122). Instead, the ECtHR reached 
the decision that Ms Siliadin was subjected to servitude and forced labor. In 
terms of the term “servitude”, the ECtHR concluded that “servitude” means an 
obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion and 
is loosely linked to the concept of “slavery” described above. To determine this 
point, the Court considered that the applicant was a minor, an irregularized 
migrant, afraid of being arrested by the police and therefore vulnerable, 
isolated, and with no means of living elsewhere than in the home of her 
employers.  
While this decision was celebrated for its significance in proving the ECHR 
as a living instrument with an increasing relevance to labor rights (see e.g. 
Mantouvalou 2006), it also drew some criticism with regard to the 
understanding of slavery. The criticism was based on the applicability of Article 
4, arguing that the better approach would be to understand the prohibition of 
slavery as both de jure and de facto, and therefore also making this judgement 
on the basis of slavery possible today (see e.g. Milano 2017). The decision was 
further criticised on the adjudication of State’s positive obligations in relation to 
the conduct, as the ECtHR focused solely on the positive obligation to enact 
criminal law provisions. Arguably, this stance shows a preoccupation with 
slavery as a situation pertaining to a person’s legal status. As far as the 
substantive harms inflicted on the victim, such a stance fails to address issues 
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such as victim protection, prevention, and restitution, as well as wider amends 
such as decriminalization of irregularized and exploited children, for the 
purposes of accessing education and services. 
 
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, ECtHR 2010 
 
Following on from this, in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010), the focus shifts 
from domestic servitude to labour exploitation and human trafficking. The Court 
was confronted with the issues of irregularized non-citizens in Cyprus being 
employed under “artiste” visas and work permits. This was the first judgement, 
in which the ECtHR focused explicitly on human trafficking. In this case, the 
applicant, Mr Rantsev – the father of a Russian national, brought a complaint 
against Cyprus and Russia in the ECtHR in relation to the death of his 20-year-
old daughter, Ms Oxana Rantseva. Ms Rantseva was a Russian national who 
entered Cyprus under an artiste visa and work permit to work in a cabaret, an 
arrangement that was “well known and commonly acknowledged” to be 
associated with sexual exploitation of foreign women coming to Cyprus mainly 
from the former states of the Soviet Union (Rantsev, paras 83-85). Upon 
attempting to escape, she was found by the manager of the cabaret, Mr M.A., 
who took her to a police station in order to process her deportation. Upon 
arrival, Mr M.A. explained that Ms Rantseva had only recently arrived in Cyprus 
and had left her employment without warning and had also moved out of the 
accommodation provided to her. Mr M.A. then handed her passport and other 
documents to the police officers. The police failed to investigate Ms Rantseva’s 
possible subjection to trafficking for sexual exploitation, but only checked 
whether her name was on a list of persons wanted by the police. On finding that 
she was not, they asked the cabaret manager to return and collect her. 
Subsequently, Mr M.A. took Ms Rantseva to the apartment of an employee of 
his. A few hours later she was found dead on the street below the apartment, 
having fallen from the second floor of the building in “ambiguous and 
unexplained”, “strange circumstances” (Rantsev, paras 41, 51, 62, 234).  
As part of his complaint, Mr Rantsev argued that an effective investigation 
into the circumstances surrounding the death of his daughter should have 
included the persons or methods involved in the recruitment of Ms Rantseva. 
Particularly, he claimed that Cyprus and Russia had violated their obligations 
under Article 2 of the ECHR to conduct an effective investigation into the 
circumstances of the victim’s death. He pointed to alleged contradictions 
between the autopsies of the Cypriot and the Russian authorities and his 
requests to Cyprus through the relevant Russian authorities, for further 
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investigation of apparent anomalies, were not followed up by the authorities. 
Part of his complaint also built on the fact that he was not informed of the 
progress of the case or of other remedies available to him. 
In considering the case, the Court found that the adoption of the Palermo 
Protocol as well as of the European Trafficking Convention has demonstrated 
the increasing prevalence of human trafficking at international level and the 
need for measures to combat it. Further, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’s judgement in Kunarac was brought to appraise the 
concept of slavery, in an effort to depart from the restrictive interpretation of 
slavery adopted in Siliadin v. France. In considering this context, the ECtHR 
established the incompatibility of human trafficking with the values of the ECHR 
and with the wider international legal norms. While this was a decisive step, it 
is important to consider how approaching trafficking through slavery as a 
juridical concept entails an ambivalence towards addressing effectively the 
substantive harms inflicted.  
Firstly, the ECtHR examined what conduct is prohibited under Article 4 of 
the ECHR and concluded that human trafficking falls within the realm of Article 
4 of the ECHR, without offering any further guidance as to how this is the case. 
Rather vaguely, trafficking was described as based on the exercise of powers 
attached to “ownership”, which applies to chattel slavery and “to a different 
degree” to trafficking, as a contemporary form of slavery (see Rantsev, para 
142). This however has been described as an “arbitrary limitation” (see Milano 
2017: 706), since the Palermo Protocol and the European Trafficking Convention 
define human trafficking as a set of acts that include various forms of 
exploitation separate from and perhaps also including slavery.  
Secondly, the ECtHR considered again what the scope of State’s positive 
obligations in relation to the conduct is. In this respect, the ECtHR ruled that the 
complaints about the states’ obligation under Articles 2, 4 and 5 were 
admissible. In explaining these obligations, the ECtHR implicitly referred to the 
“three Ps” approach (prevention, prosecution, protection), by asserting that 
States should be taking steps to identify people at real and immediate risk of 
being trafficked. Accordingly, the Court considered the procedural elements in 
investigations of potential trafficking and found that Cyprus was in breach of its 
obligations: Cyprus failed to adapt a framework that prevented the risk of 
human trafficking and handed Ms Rantseva back to her traffickers, failed to 
enact criminal law provisions, and failed to enact an effective investigation into 
Ms Rantseva’s death. In its decision the Court held that there has been a 
violation of Article 4 by Cyprus by not affording to Ms Rantseva practical and 
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effective protection against trafficking and exploitation in general and by not 
taking the necessary measures to protect her. Simultaneously, the Court 
determined that there was no need to examine separately the alleged breach of 
Article 4 concerning the failure of Cypriot authorities to conduct an 
investigation. Therefore, effectively, the Court conflated the lines between 
protection and investigation (see also Stoyanova, this volume). 
Thirdly, the ECtHR also found a procedural violation of Article 4 by Russia, 
awarding 2,000 euros for non-pecuniary damages sustained by Mr Rantsev due 
to the conduct of the Russian authorities, but ruled that he was not entitled to 
other claims such as travel expenses, translations, or funeral costs, to obtain the 
necessary funds for which Mr Rantsev had sold his home in Russia. Hence, the 
above three aspects of the Court’s decision arguably illustrate considerable 
limitations in acknowledging and addressing a range of substantive harms 
involved in human trafficking.  
 
L.E. v. Greece, no. 71545/12, ECtHR 2016 
  
Finally, in L.E. v. Greece, the ECtHR makes a second attempt at distinguishing 
slavery and human trafficking. To summarize the facts, Ms L.E., a Nigerian 
woman born in 1982, entered Greece in June 2004 accompanied by Mr K.A. He 
had allegedly promised her that he would take her to Greece to work in bars and 
nightclubs in exchange for a pledge to pay him 40,000 euros. Upon arrival in 
Greece, Mr K.A. confiscated her passport and forced her into prostitution for 
approximately two years. Eventually Ms L.E. contacted Nea Zoi, a non-
governmental organization, which provides support to trafficked women. In July 
2004 Ms L.E. had applied for asylum but did not take a place that was reserved 
for her at a reception center for asylum seekers in June 2005. Subsequently, she 
was arrested for prostitution and immigration law violations. In that instance 
she was acquitted by the court, but she was arrested again in March 2006, then 
convicted at first instance and acquitted on appeal. In April 2006 an expulsion 
order was issued against her by the police, but this was suspended. In November 
2006, Ms L.E. was again arrested for prostitution, tried and acquitted, but she 
was subsequently detained awaiting deportation, as she did not have a 
residence permit in Greece. While in police detention, Ms L.E. lodged a criminal 
complaint against Mr K.A. and his partner Ms D.J., claiming that she was a victim 
of human trafficking and accused them of forcing her and two other Nigerian 
women into prostitution. The prosecutor dismissed her complaint, and her claim 
that she had been a victim of human trafficking. Ms L.E. applied for a re-
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examination of her complaint in January 2007 and this time the prosecutor 
brought criminal proceedings against Mr K.A. and Ms D.J. for the offence of 
human trafficking. Ms D.J. was subsequently arrested and remanded in custody, 
but in 2012 a court held that she was not an accomplice but another victim of 
K.A. The Greek authorities renewed Ms L.E.’s residence permit until 2014. 
 The ECtHR was asked to consider the issues also presented in Rantsev, 
namely, the applicability and relevance of Article 4 to trafficking, as well as the 
scope of positive obligations arising by the general principles derived from 
Article 4. The ECtHR, however, merely reaffirmed that human trafficking falls 
under Article 4 of the ECHR without elaborating on the relation between slavery 
and human trafficking. As regards the positive obligations, the Court accepted 
that Articles 2, 3, and 4, enshrine the fundamental values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe and that, therefore, the scope of 
positive obligations should be expanded to grant further protections. Greece’s 
national legal framework (Article 351 of the Greek Criminal Code in line with the 
Palermo Protocol and the European Trafficking Convention), was found capable 
of providing Ms L.E. with practical and effective protection. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s approach towards the assessment of the effectiveness of Greece’s legal 
and administrative framework relating to human trafficking has been criticized 
as very superficial and lacking in rigor (Stoyanova 2016). The Court failed to 
acknowledge that Ms L.E. had been arrested several times prior to receiving any 
form of protection from the Greek authorities. On the other hand, the Court’s 
reaffirmation of the positive obligations of states under Article 4 of the ECHR, 
and more specifically its view that a lack of promptness, several delays, as well 
as other procedural failings constitute a violation of Article 4 has been welcomed 
as a positive development given the scarcity of relevant case law. The ECtHR also 
held that in this case there had been violations of Article 6§1 (due to failing to 
meet the “reasonable time” requirement) and Article 13 (for complaints about 
the length of proceedings). As a result, Greece was to pay Ms L.E. €12,000 for 
non-pecuniary damages and €3,000 for costs and expenses.  
When considering such cases, it is hard to escape the feeling that formal 
justice processes are just tinkering around the edges: the harms suffered by the 
victims remain substantively unaddressed. These cases also offer an urgent 
reminder that what we define as slavery encompasses other acts that have been 
normalized and naturalized, such as the everyday workings of the capitalist 
system. While there exists a sizeable arsenal of punitive measures, beyond these 
there is a lack of alternative solutions. When it comes to right entitlements it is 
mostly in Siliadin v. France (para 49) where the Court refers to rights for 
domestic workers guaranteeing: the recognition of “domestic work in private 
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households as ‘real work’, that is, to which full employment rights and social 
protection apply, including the minimum wage (where it exists), sickness and 
maternity pay as well as pension rights”; “the right to a legally enforceable 
contract of employment setting out minimum wages, maximum hours and 
responsibilities”; “the right to health insurance”; “the right for migrant domestic 
workers to an immigration status independent of any employer”; “the right to 
change employer and travel within the host country and between all countries 
of the European Union and the right to the recognition of qualifications, training 
and experience obtained in the home country”. However, overall there is a lack 
of continuity in addressing right entitlements and in putting them into action.  
 
SDGs and Slavery Discourses 
In the field of international development, spearheaded by the United Nations, 
consecutive frameworks, namely the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(2000-2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015-2030), have 
attempted to consolidate the agendas of development, climate change, 
equality, employment, and sustainability since the late 1990s. Soon after their 
conception in 2000, the MDGs became arguably the “yardstick” of development 
progress and a new development “paradigm” (Gabay 2012; Tiwari 2015: 314). 
Drawing attention to development that included both economic drivers but also 
non-economic dimensions, such as health, education, and gender, the MDGs 
signalled a new aspirational era, through the echoing commitment to reduce 
poverty and address human deprivations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the MDGs 
were described by the UN secretary-general as “the most successful global anti-
poverty push in history” (UN 2013).  
 Against the backdrop of success, the MDGs were superseded by the post-
2015 SDGs agenda. The latter was being conceived amidst acute financial 
uncertainties spanning over the last ten years, predictions of spiralling 
inequalities, and poverty. For critics, the SDGs themselves attest to the timid 
accomplishments of the MDGs era, while incorporating the core themes of 
poverty, education, health, and the remaining unmet targets in the post-2015 
development discourse (see e.g. Tiwari 2015). The SDGs were adopted at the 
UN Sustainable Development Summit of 25 September 2015 by the High-level 
Political Forum on Sustainable Development in the Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on 25 September 2015, 70/1 Transforming our world: the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/Res/70/1). In principle, the SDGs 
offer a systematic agenda for global development between 2015 and 2030 
grounded upon 17 Sustainable Development Goals.  
While prior to the SDGs there were piecemeal references to slavery and 
trafficking in international development and a lack of referencing of either 
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slavery or trafficking in the MDGs (UN 2015 The Millennium Development Goals 
Report), the 2030 Agenda created an ambiguous, liminal space for the co-
existence of slavery and trafficking under the same goal. This complimentary or 
arguably metonymic use of slavery for trafficking and vice versa has been 
intimated in various places. References to human trafficking are scattered 
throughout the 2030 Agenda, for instance, Goal 5.2 sustains that states should 
“[e]liminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and 
private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation”. 
Further, Goal 16.2 sets out that states should “[e]nd abuse, exploitation, 
trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children”. In its 
Declaration (para 27) human trafficking is linked to forced labour, since states 
should “eradicate forced labour and human trafficking and end child labour in 
all its forms”. While, redistribution of resources and sharing of wealth should 
also be part of addressing slavery and human trafficking: “[s]ustained, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth is essential for prosperity. This will only be 
possible if wealth is shared and income inequality is addressed” (para 27). 
Explicit references to the link between slavery and human trafficking as 
well as between slavery, human trafficking, forced labour, and child labour have 
been made via Goal 8. According to this, [states must] “[p]romote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment 
and decent work for all”. Further, specifically through Goal 8.7, states should:  
“[t]ake immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end 
modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms”. 
In this sense, the link between slavery and human trafficking has culminated in 
“transfers of meaning” (Nunberg 1995). Whereby, the discursive use of slavery 
presupposes a co-dependency with human trafficking. If the word “slavery” is 
then used in a transferred sense, it is possible to use the word to refer to 
disjointed sorts of things. This is not the same as the limited possibilities of 
substitution; the mechanisms are not trying to substitute “slavery” with “human 
trafficking” but to construe a new field of knowledge and study of inquiry, 
according to which slavery is transferred upon human trafficking and vice versa. 
This would serve a dual target: to either interdefine slavery and human 
trafficking by imposing some apparent sortal crossings between the two, and/or 
to present that solutions to the one are densely metonymous to the solutions 
to the other. 
In parallel with the legal cases examined earlier, arguably, the language 
of state responsibility has transpired in the SDGs’ attempts to predicate transfer. 
However, concerns have been raised about the actual push for state 
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responsibility and accountability (e.g. Barry 2003; Young 2006). Particularly, in 
the repeated references to “consideration for national circumstances” and in 
vague obligations for non-governmental actors, a causal sense of responsibility 
is missing or at best “is hidden between the lines in paragraphs on poverty, debt 
and environmental issues” (Bexell and Jönsson 2017: 18). As such, critics have 
maintained that as with the MDGs, the SDGs have been masking root causes of 
the problems, while neglecting how power relations may impede accountability 
and real change. 
 
 
The UK, slavery and the SDGs 
 
As discussed above, the MDGs were inclusive of many key development issues, 
but not of human trafficking nor slavery. This changed with the SDG negotiations 
in 2015, and now slavery and human trafficking are mentioned in a number of 
the SDGs, most notably in 8.7. This significant change did not just happen on its 
own. There were protracted international negotiations as to what would be 
included and excluded from the final agreed version of the SDGs. A number of 
reasons could be attributed to this inclusion. Arguably that slavery is on the 
increase, and that an effective coalition of interested parties has come together 
to influence its inclusion in the development agenda. Key players have been 
NGOs, the ILO, as well as some governments, such as the UK government.   
Within the UK, discussions around linking modern slavery to poverty and 
inequality commenced in 2007, when the UK government, the International 
Labour Organisation, as well as the NGO Anti-Slavery International (ASI) held a 
high-level cross sector conference with the aim to connect the issues of 
“poverty, development and the elimination of slavery” (McQuade 2015). 
According to ASI, the decisive moment in forcing the idea of slavery onto the 
sustainable development agenda occurred in late 2013, at a conference called 
by Pope Francis in the Vatican. Adrian McQuade (2015), the director of ASI, 
recalls that this conference felt like a “last cast of the die” to get the issue of 
slavery onto the international development agenda:  
“with the endorsement of the Pope something of a critical mass started 
to form around the issue with the British Government, particularly its 
Anti-Slavery Commissioner Kevin Hyland, Jeffrey Sachs, an adviser to the 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and others endorsing the idea”. 
 Formally, the Modern Slavery Bill in the UK was first debated in June 2014. 
In its second reading the then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, clearly 
articulated its vision along the lines of “more arrests and more prosecutions”: 
“tackling modern slavery will require … a determined and focused law 
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enforcement response” (House of Commons [8 July 2014, column 166]). 
Eventually, the parliament passed the Modern Slavery Act in 2015. The Act is 
focused on the criminalization of modern slavery and human trafficking, and the 
establishment of the Anti-Slavery Commissioner whose role focuses on 
prevention of modern slavery offenses and identification of victims. These 
developments have been linked directly to the final stages of the SDG 
negotiations, as it was the work of the UK Government [in addition to the efforts 
of the UK, South Africa and Argentina], the Vatican’s Pontifical Academy of 
Social Sciences, the “Santa Marta Group: Church and Law Enforcement 
Combatting Modern Slavery”, and some of G77 governments, that “Ending 
modern slavery and human trafficking” was accepted as an amendment and 
added into SDG 8 (Anti-Slavery Commissioner n.d.; Anti-Slavery Commissioner 
2016).  
While the UK government responded to and worked with interest groups 
to include human trafficking and anti-slavery targets in the SDGs, these goals 
and targets are up for interpretation by governments, and the SDGs are not 
legally binding instruments. So, while the UK government’s interpretation of the 
SDGs has been in line with enacting legislation and setting up the Anti-Slavery 
Commissioner, these measures do not focus on the causes of slavery and the 
links to poverty (the original reason for linking slavery to the SDGs), but on the 




From our investigation two key points become evident. Firstly, in recent 
decisions of the ECtHR and in the SDGs, the discursive use of slavery 
presupposes a contiguity with human trafficking. The word “slavery” is then 
used in a transferred sense and, hence, it is possible to use the word to refer to 
disjointed meanings. This is not the same as the limited possibilities of 
substitution; the mechanisms are not trying to substitute “slavery” with “human 
trafficking” but to construe a new field of knowledge and study of inquiry, 
according to which slavery is transferred upon human trafficking and vice versa. 
 Secondly, while one may assume that merging slavery and human 
trafficking may shed light on structural causes, such as poverty, income 
inequality, injustice, discrimination, exclusion, (un)freedom of movement, 
(un)freedom from want, and a variety of harms related to unequal access to 
services that underpin both human trafficking and slavery, this is not the case. 
As the existent case law is concerned, the spotlight is on crime, crime control, 
and criminalization. Simultaneously, the available solutions of decriminalizing 
irregularized migrants and offering access to an indiscriminate regime of rights 
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are being cast aside. As far as development is concerned, there is an undeniable 
gap between the purported targets and the measures used to achieve these 
targets. 
 As a result of the above, this chapter puts forward a different set of 
recommendations (see also Boukli and Renz 2018). It counter-poses a 
zemiological approach, which focuses on the harms rather than the crimes. This 
would involve prioritizing the communities and the people involved in human 
trafficking rather than focusing on formal mechanisms that ostracize and 
criminalize survivors. This would also involve an evidence-based discussion of 
trafficking that may actually reduce harm by pointing to areas that require 
better legal protection to prevent victimization, better access to resources, and 
better support mechanisms to survive and overcome harm. The orienting target 
is not abolition as a legal/juridical model of anti-slavery, but advancing structural 
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